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CANTON R. CO. v. ROGAN
Thus under the "unbroken chain" theory the amount of the
judgment in favor of the subpurchaser would also serve as
the measure of damages between the original seller and the
first purchaser. Hence, where there have been successive
sales accompanied by implied or express warranties and a
breach would arise from an outstanding title, and if costs
and attorney's fees were carried forward and finally paid
by the original warrantor, then it is quite likely that the
final figure would be an amount greatly in excess of the
original value of the chattel. Although it may appear to be
an undue hardship on the original purchaser in making
him sustain a loss of an amount greater than what he had
originally paid for the chattel, he still has a cause of action
against his fraudulent vendor. As a practical matter, it is
doubtful, if any actual recovery could be realized from
such a fraudulent vendor.
In the principal case the fairest possible result was
reached. Each of the parties was allowed to recover back
from their immediate purchaser the amount they had paid
for the car. The accessories that had been added to the car
were paid for by the plaintiff who replevied the car. The
costs of the various parties were equally divided among
them.
EFFECT OF IMPORT-EXPORT AND COMMERCE
CLAUSES ON FRANCHISE TAX MEASURED
BY GROSS RECEIPTS
Canton R. Co. v. Rogan1
Western Md. R. Co. v. Rogan2
The State of Maryland imposed on steam railroad com-
panies a non-discriminatory franchise tax measured by
gross receipts apportioned to the length of their lines within
the state in lieu of all other taxes.3 Appellant, Canton Rail-
road, engaged in switching freight cars from its piers to
lines of connecting railroads, wharfage, weighing of loaded
freight cars, storage, and other services offered by a marine
terminal. The appellant contested the validity of the tax
under the import-export and commerce clauses of the
United States Constitution.
1340 U. S. 511 (1951).
'340 U. S. 520 (1951), argued and decided at the same time.
8 Md. Code (1951), Art. 81, Secs. 127, 128.
1953]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
The Maryland Court of Appeals sustained the tax, on
the ground that since ad valorem taxes on property used
in and derived from the process of importing and exporting
are valid, franchise taxes in lieu of such ad valorem taxes
are not barred by the import-export clause.' Two judges
dissented. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the tax again
was upheld, Justice Jackson reserving judgment in a sepa-
rate opinion in which Justice Frankfurter joined. Justice
Douglas, in the majority opinion, held the tax not to be
repugnant to the import-export clause on the ground that
the tax was not imposed on imports or exports, but merely
on the handling thereof.
The Court took the view that the import-export clause
does not afford protection against a tax on the activities
connected with the process of importing or exporting (at
least beyond the water's edge) because the scope of im-
munity should be more narrow when the tax is not upon
the goods; otherwise, a zone of tax immunity never before
imagined would be created.
Justice Jackson in his separate opinion stated that he
did not feel in a position to express a final view on the
question at issue since the effect of federal policy upon the
validity of the Maryland tax was not argued by counsel. He
discussed the point that the prohibition of a tax on exports
and imports goes beyond exempting specific articles from
ad valorem duties - that it prohibits taxing imports and
exports as a process. He observed that this premise has
been manifested in the preferred treatment of exports given
by the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Supreme
Court, and rail and motor carriers through lower rate
structures. He saw in the detailed treatment which the
federal constitution gives to imports and exports a recog-
nition of the dangerous results which could ensue were the
strategically located states enjoying advantageous ports to
exploit their location.
In the companion case, Western Maryland R. Co. v.
Rogan, decided the same day the Court, dividing the same
way, upheld the same tax as applied to the Western Mary-
land Railway Co., which operates several piers in the port
of Baltimore, as well as a grain elevator, with a substantial
portion of its freight traffic to and from these facilities con-
sisting of the transportation of goods into or to be exported
from the United States. Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for
the majority said in part:
1 Western Md. R. Co. v. State Tax Com'n., 73 A. 2d 12 (1950).
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"The present facts illustrate how wide a zone of
tax immunity would be created if the contrary holding
were made in the Canton R. Co. case. There we were
dealing with the handling of exports and imports with-
in a port. Here we have transportation of exports and
imports to and from the port. If Maryland were re-
quired to grant tax immunity to the services involved
in getting the exports to the port and the imports to
their destination, so would any other State. The ulti-
mate impact of such a holding is difficult to measure,
since manifold services are involved in the movement
of exports and imports within the country. Problems
of this nature, like many problems in the law, involve
the drawing of lines. So far as taxes on activities con-
nected with bringing exports to or imports from the
ship are concerned, we think the line must be drawn
at the water's edge. Whether loading and unloading
would be exempt is a question we reserve."
The majority holding in these two cases seems difficult
to reconcile with prior decisions involving the import-
export clause. While the commerce clause5 vests in Con-
gress plenary power to deal with interstate commerce, it
does not in terms prohibit state taxation. Consequently,
such prohibition is implied only when the state tax con-
stitutes an undue burden on or regulation of interstate
commerce.' On the other hand, the import-export clause 7
expressly prohibits all state taxation without the consent
of Congress, with only one named exception. It follows that
a state tax could be valid as respects interstate commerce,
but invalid as to foreign commerce.'
Taxes on or measured by gross receipts from interstate
commerce have generally been held invalid.9 Where, how-
5 United States Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 3, cl. 3.
6 Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S. 230 (1887) ; Leloup v. Mobile, 127 U. S. 640
(1888) ; McCall v. California, 136 U. S. 104 (1890) ; Adams Express Co. v.
New York, 232 U. S. 14 (1914) ; McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U. S.
33 (1940).
United States Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 10, cl. 2.
8 Mr. Justice Douglas, in Joseph v. Carter and Weekes Co., 330 U. S. 422,
434 (1947), pointed out in his dissent (p. 445) that the Court has been free
to -balance local and national interests in regard to state taxation of inter-
state commerce since the commerce clause does not expressly forbid any
such tax, but that the import-export clause admits of only one exception;
that consequently a state tax might survive the commerce clause, but fall
under the import-export clause.
9 Philadelphia Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326 (1887) ; Rat-
terman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 127 U. S. 411 (1888) ; Western Union Tel.
Co. v. Alabama, 132 U. S. 472 (1889) ; Galveston, Harrisburg and San An-
tonio Railway Co. v. State of Texas, 210 U. S. 217 (1908).
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ever, such taxes have been non-discriminatory and either
fairly apportioned ° or in lieu of other legitimate property
taxes," they have been sustained, since they have then no
unduly restrictive effect upon interstate commerce; and,
that being so, interstate commerce should "pay its way",
i.e., should assume its fair share of the state tax burden.
In such cases, the court's task is to reconcile the competing
demands of interstate commerce to be free from restrictive
state taxation on the one hand, and the power of the state
to make interstate commerce pay its way on the other. 2
But a state tax on imports or exports, being expressly
prohibited by the federal constitution, is void, whether or
not its effect upon the import-export process would be
restrictive and irrespective of the extent of the restriction.
In construing taxes involving the import-export clause the
court is not free, as in cases under the commerce clause, to
look at the effect of the tax, and to determine its validity
with reference thereto.
It has been held in Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania,3
that a state tax on gross receipts from the sale of goods in
foreign commerce is a tax on exports and void for that
reason. In Brown v. Maryland,4 the Supreme Court held
invalid a state license tax on the privilege of selling imports,
declaring such a tax to be tantamount to a direct tax on the
imported articles, thereby forbidding a state to accomplish
indirectly that which is constitutionally proscribed when
attempted directly.
As regards the instant case, assuming the tax may be
justified as a tax on interstate commerce, because of its
being non-discriminatory, apportioned, and in lieu of all
other taxes, nevertheless, such characteristics would seem
irrelevant if the tax is viewed as being a direct tax on im-
ports. Consequently, in order to sustain the validity of the
tax, the court is necessarily driven to a holding that it is
not a tax on imports or exports, but that the tax is merely
on the handling of the articles.
If the selling of imports is an activity intimately and in-
dispensably connected with imported articles, as Brown v.
Maryland and Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania seem to
1" Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U. S. 653 (1948).
"Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 142 U. S. 217 (1891) ; United States
Express Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U. S. 335 (1912); Cudahy Packing Co. v.
Minnesota, 246 U. S. 450 (1918).
"Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Richmond, 249 U. S. 252, 259 (1919);
Western Livestock v. Bureau, 303 U. S. 250 (1938) ; McGoldrick v. Berwind-
White Coal Mining Co., 309 U. S. 33 (1940).
245 U. S. 292 (1917).
"12 Wheat. 419 (U. S., 1827).
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hold, then it would appear that their transportation or
handling should be so characterized also. Prior cases have
not confined the scope of the import-export clause to taxes
on the goods themselves, but have struck down a stamp tax
on bills of lading covering exported gold and silver, 5 a
federal stamp tax on foreign bills of lading, 6 a federal tax
on charter parties, 7 a federal tax upon baseball equipment
when applied to foreign shipments," and a stamp tax on
ocean marine insurance. 9
In Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Co.,"0 the Supreme Court
declared invalid a New York City excise tax on the gross
receipts of a stevedoring corporation engaged solely in New
York City in loading and unloading vessels moving in inter-
state and foreign commerce on the ground that it was un-
duly burdensome to interstate and foreign commerce, and
thus repugnant to the commerce clause. It is important to
observe that this case dealt with a tax on the gross receipts
derived from the handling of goods. Justice Douglas, dis-
senting in part, expressed the view that the tax was valid
under the commerce clause, but invalid under the import-
export clause,2' stating that loading and unloading are a
part of "the exporting process" which the import-export
clause protects from state taxation, and cited with approval
a case holding that activity which is a "step in exportation"
has the same immunity.2
The words "imports" and "exports" as used in Art. 1,
par. 10, cl. 2 of the federal constitution are words of art
I Almy v. State of California, 24 How. 169 (U. S., 1860). Although this
case was later held to have been erroneously decided on the facts, it was
upheld under the interstate commerce clause. Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall.
123, 137-8 (U. S., 1868).
Fairbank v. United States, 181 U. S. 283 (1901).
17 United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U. S. 1 (1915).
Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, 262 U. S. 66 (1923).
Thames & Mersey Ins. Co. v. United States, 237 U. S. 19 (1915).
330 U. S. 422 (1947).
Ibid, 434 (dis. op.).
Ibid, 434, 445, citing Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, supra, n. 18. A minor
but interesting question arises out of the facts of the Canton case. Consti-
tuting a very small part of Canton's gross receipts was the rent received by
Canton from a stevedoring company for the privilege of using Canton's
cranes. Located upon Canton's dock, the cranes scooped quantities of ore
and other raw materials from docked ships and deposited the material into
hopper cars. This seems to be a part of the unloading process. If the gross
receipts derived from the use of human labor engaged in loading and un-
loading are exempt from taxation, as the Joseph v. Carter and Weekes case
held, then it would seem to follow that the rental proceeds from the use of
machinery in loading and unloading would be entitled to a like immunity.
However, the court said that since Canton did not do the loading and
unloading, but merely rented a crane, it was not necessary to decide whether
the loading and unloading were immune from the tax.
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which include not only the articles of import and export
but also the processes of importation and exportation.23
Although the court in the instant case takes cognizance
of the above propositions, it escapes a direct conflict with
the Joseph v. Carter & Weekes case by the adoption of a
"water's edge" test so far as the handling of goods is con-
cerned. Such a test has not been heretofore resorted to,
either as to taxes on the goods themselves24 or on dealing
therewith.25
If the handling of goods in the harbor is part of the im-
port-export process because such goods are import-export
articles, as the Joseph v. Carter & Weekes case implies and
the instant case seems to recognize, there is no apparent
reason why it is not equally so beyond the water's edge if
the goods are of like character. It is the character of the
goods handled, rather than the place of handling, which is
determinative.
The distinction seems to have been made by the Supreme
Court frankly as a matter of policy on the ground that the
zone of immunity from state taxation would be expanded to
an undesirable extent were the limitation not imposed.
The court expressed apprehension that, were the water's
edge test not adopted, the immunity would extend back to
the forests, mines, and factories. This, it is submitted, is
hardly likely in the light of prior decisions.
In order to prevent just such undue expansion or distor-
tion of the scope of the import-export clause, the court in
the past has upheld state taxation on imported articles when
their original packages have been broken;2 when they have
been commingled with other property in the taxing state;27
when they have been sold;25 or when they have been de-
voted to the purpose for which they were imported.2 As
to articles destined for exportation, they are subject to
state taxation until the articles of commerce are on their
Lectures on the Constitution of the United States, (1893) Miller, 591.
Hooven and Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U. S. 652 (1945) ; Joy Oil Co. v.
State Tax Commission, 337 U. S. 286 (1949).
2C. Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board, 329 U. S. 69 (1946). One hun-
dred and twenty-five years ago counsel for Maryland in the famous case of
Brown v. Maryland argued that the entrance into the country of the imports
(which is a test similar to -the "water's edge" test) should be the point at
which the article's immunity from state taxation should cease, but the court
specifically repudiated the contention (supra, n. 14, 441, 442). Moreover, the
same counsel, Roger B. Taney, when he became chief justice of the very
court before which he previously argued, rejected his earlier argument
Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 5 How. 504, 575-576 (U. S., 1847).
.May v. New Orleans, 178 U. S. 496 (1900).
MIbid, 508; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 441-2 (U. S., 1827).
10 Waring v. The Mayor, 8 Wal. 110 (U. S., 1868).
Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U. S. 652, 666 (1945).
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final journey;3° or when the goods are earmarked and com-
mitted to the stream of exportation by actual delivery to
the carrier.3" It is the entrance of the articles into the export
stream that marks the start of the process of exportation.2
Until shipped or started on its final journey out of the state
its exportation is a matter altogether in fieri and not at all
a fixed and certain thing. 33
As pointed out in Justice Jackson's opinion, both the
result and the reasoning of the instant case may hold un-
settling and unpredictable consequences. It is submitted
that the court in the instant case, as in cases under the
commerce clause is in effect testing the validity of state
taxation in terms of its restrictive effect, and attempting
to balance local and national interests according to its view
as to what a proper adjustment thereof requires. As Justice
Jackson warns, if the express constitutional prohibition
against state taxation can be avoided by shifting the tax
from the articles of import and export to some incident of
the necessary processes involved in importation and ex-
portation taking place beyond the water's edge,34 the policy
and purpose of the import-export clause can be nullified as
a practical matter.
10 Cf. Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517 (1886) ; Empresa Siderurgica v. Merced
County, 337 U. S. 154 (1949) ; Joy Oil Co. v. State Tax Comm'n., 337 U. S.
286 (1949).Joy Oil Co. v. State Tax Comm'n., ibid.
"Empresa Siderurgica v. Merced County, supra, n. 30, 157.
Cf. Coe v. Errol, supra, n. 30; and see Joy Oil Co. v. State Tax Comm'n.,
supra, n. 30.
,Also consider Joy Oil Co. v. State Tax Comm'n., supra, n. 30, where the
court sustained a Michigan ad valorem tax upon gasoline purchased In
Michigan, for export to Canada, shipped by rail to Detroit under bills of
lading marked "For Export to Canada", which gasoline was stored in
tanks in Dearborn due to an inability to transport the gasoline because of
wartime restrictions. The majority held that the tax did not contravene
the import-export clause, since the first step in exportation, though taken,
had been sufficiently interrupted to break the continuity of the exportation
process. Despite the result of the case, It Is important to note that -the court
held that the exportation process started when the goods were earmarked
by the bill of lading and put on board the carrier in Grand Rapids, Michi-
gan. Here the goods were held to be In the exporting process though they
were more than one hundred miles from the water's edge. It is true that
the tax here was directly upon the goods, but the court, in order to ascer-
tain if the goods were in fact exports, looked to see whether or not the
goods were in the stream of the export process. Consequently, no mere
dictum Is involved In the Joy case's statement as to when the exportation
process begins. The ratio decidendi of the Joy case is that goods in the
export process, which are stored for 15 months are no longer exports, but
are subject to a state ad valorem tax.
